With increasing communication restrictions in Iran, interest has resurfaced in decentralized communication applications that operate outside traditional networks, as a necessary alternative when internet and phone services are blocked or severely restricted.
In January 2026, Iranian authorities implemented a widespread internet shutdown as protests escalated. Reuters reported that the measure was aimed at curbing unrest, while Human Rights Watch later confirmed that the country also experienced a near-total internet blackout on February 28, 2026, with internet traffic plummeting by 98 percent, according to data cited by the organization.
Mesh networks
In such circumstances, mesh networks emerge as a crucial communication infrastructure. This architecture relies on direct peer-to-peer connections between nearby devices via Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, allowing messages to travel from one phone to another in a series of “hops” without the need for a central server or traditional cellular coverage.
A Carnegie Endowment study indicates that this type of network is one of the few digital options available during a complete internet shutdown. The study notes that Hong Kong activists relied heavily on such applications, like Bridgefy, during the 2019–2020 protests.
Reuters also reported that protesters in Hong Kong had already turned to applications based on the same technology, and that Bridgefy’s use surged in Myanmar after the 2021 coup. Among the most prominent of these applications is Briar, an open-source app originally designed for activists, journalists, and those requiring more censorship-resistant communication. According to the project’s official website, Briar doesn’t rely on a central server. Instead, it synchronizes messages directly between users’ devices and can operate via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and even memory cards when the internet is down. It utilizes the Tor network when internet access is available. The project emphasizes that communication between devices is end-to-end encrypted, and the contact list remains encrypted on the user’s device. The user guide explains that account creation is done locally on the device, and adding nearby contacts is done by reciprocally scanning a QR code.
Bridgefy, on the other hand, uses Bluetooth mesh technology. Its official pages state that it requires an internet connection when the application is first opened for login, but it can then function offline. Its introductory materials also mention that messages can travel approximately 100 meters in a single pass and then extend further through other phones acting as intermediary nodes within the network.
However, the crucial difference here is that Briar and Bridgefy should not be considered in the same security category. While Briar presents itself as a censorship-resistant, end-to-end encrypted tool, Bridgefy has faced serious security criticism from academic researchers.
A 2020 study by Royal Holloway found critical vulnerabilities in the application, and a subsequent study by ETH Zurich concluded that adopting the Signal protocol did not address all of the aforementioned security issues, and that some security claims remained unfulfilled.
Therefore, describing Bridgefy as offering robust privacy always requires a degree of editorial caution.
In the specific case of Iran, reliable sources consistently report widespread and frequent internet outages and a shift towards alternative communication tools based on Bluetooth and decentralized networks.
Reuters reported in January 2026 that Iranians had turned to Bitchat, an application that uses the same Bluetooth mesh technology, confirming that the environment of digital repression in Iran has indeed driven the search for communication alternatives outside the traditional internet. But within the limits of what I have reviewed from major and reliable sources, I have not found strong independent documentation proving that Briar and Bridgefy were specifically the two main tools for coordinating university sit-ins and strikes in Iran during 2026. Therefore, it is more accurate from a journalistic standpoint to say that these applications represent prominent examples of tools that are commonly used in environments of closure and censorship, rather than asserting that they alone or in a documented manner were the central tool of the Iranian movement.
